Brief to the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (Quebec)Introduction: Why Understanding the Language of "secular" and "secularism", "beliefs" and "faith" is Essential to the Work of this Commission. The Centre for Cultural Renewal is dedicated to exploring the important and challenging connections between beliefs (religious and non) culture and the state (law and politics at all levels) in Canada today. In the fifteen years that is has been a registered charity, it has operated on a strictly non-partisan, non-denominational basis seeking to inform public discussion in key areas of contemporary debate. We write, in particular, to this Commission, to suggest that the language employed in this area of accommodation and harmonization is essential in order to move in a fair direction for citizens in the future. The recitals to the Order in Council 95 – 2007, that established the Commission refer, amongst other things, to: "...certain accommodation practices related to cultural differences [which] might call into question the fair balance between the rights of the majority and the rights of minorities." We wish to address a key aspect of this issue—fair balance, and how the language we use to describe what the debate about religion and the state is all about, has a great deal to do with how we subsequently analyze the issues. Just as matters may be overlooked, they may also be assumed in certain words. Assumed in ways that may be shown to be confusing or wrong and that fundamentally affect fairness as we make the difficult determinations of what is fair in sharing the public sphere. In what follows we argue that it is advisable to start examining what fairness entails by looking at the basic language terms we use to describe our most basic concepts. Here that means the language we use to understand faith or beliefs in relation to the surrounding society (here the focus is the state with its central aspects of law and politics). Second, we argue that much of the standard language in this area is confused and confusing. In particular, terms such as "separation of church and state", "secularism", "believers/unbelievers" and "faith communities" tend to overlook key aspects of human being and life in communities which, if properly analyzed, could lead to better terms and better outcomes. We urge the Commission to examine these arguments and recognize the limitations that are present in some of the key terminology used before you in the Mandate and supporting Consultation paper (excellent though both are in many other respects) the Briefs submitted to date and at public hearings.Who is a "Believer" The starting off point for our comments is an observation; "all human beings are believers, the question is not one of belief or non-belief but of what is believed in." Yet how often we hear those who do not believe religion described as "unbelievers." This use of "unbelief" is a clue to other problems that soon follow and build upon it.What is "faith?" As with "belief" so it is with "faith." Everyone has "faith" of some sort and not all faiths are religious. The world is made up, in part, of believers who are parts of communities that have faith in this or that—some of this faith and belief is religious some of it is not. The separation of the world into two sharp divisions—one of "faith" and the other supposedly based upon "non-faith" is inaccurate and works against fairness when overlaid with the framework ("secular" or "secularism") that predisposes analysis against certain kinds of inclusion (religious). One of the implicit suggestions of the contemporary period is that those who are not in "communities of faith" are people of facts and/or that they do not operate out of "faith" but (and here is another false division) "reason" alone. This serves to bracket out religious adherents from other citizens; as the context usually shows, such a bifurcation is usually implicit and unintentional. In combination with other dualistic constructions, however, we shall see that this eventually leads to a general failure to understand relevant matters in a way that leads to accurate analysis of what is actually going on with respect to the state and public policy. When "faith" and "belief" (not necessarily religious) are understood to be aspects of human existence, and public policy based upon beliefs and faith (of some sort as well) we begin to see that the watertight compartments currently being used to insulate and confuse our analysis need to be replaced by better conceptions.Religious Faith and Religions matter to culture Whether our times wish to acknowledge it or not, religion and religious life have been recognized as of great importance in other places facing greater challenges to social cohesion than Canada or Quebec (and this commission's mandate includes looking at places outside Quebec for inspiration). The Constitutional Court of South Africa, for example, has said this about religion: For many believers, their relationship with God or creation is central to all their activities. It concerns their capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of themselves, their community and their universe. For millions in all walks of life, religion provides support and nurture and a framework for individual and social stability and growth. Religious belief has the capacity to awake concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights. It affects the believer's view of society and founds the distinction between right and wrong.1Ignoring such insights and moving expressly or by default to minimize the public influence of religion shows extraordinary anti-religious hubris and cultural short-sightedness. Consider this as well. It is known that in Canada, 20% of Canadians do approximately 80% of charitable giving and volunteering. When these "top 20%" are compared with the "bottom 20%" who do nothing or very little in this area, three indicators stand out as statistically significant. It turns out that two of the three most important indicators of "socially embedded" conduct (those that "join", "donate" or "volunteer") are "spiritual" or religious. That is to say, regular attendance at a place of worship (church, synagogue, temple, mosque etc.) and a high rating as to "religiosity" question ("how important is spirituality to your life?"). The third indicator is University education.2 This alone shows that religious belief should be encouraged for the good of society not thwarted because of anti-religious animus, response to bad history or the difficulties of harmonization.Is the Canadian Constitutional Framework Individualistic/Communitarian or Both? Professor John D. Whyte has noted that the Canadian Constitution has not been promulgated upon any individualistic conception of liberalism but, rather, one that respects and nurtures each person's communities or what he calls "the organic society." Moreover, the two kinds of rights protected by the Charter, group rights and individual rights, derive from different conceptions of the proper role of the state, which are both reflected in the Constitution. Where rights conflict in a society any method of resolution will have to examine its principles of living together despite differing beliefs (whether the Quebec Charter, Canadian Constitution or Quebec Human Rights, in this respect makes little difference). Professor Whyte points out that since Confederation, in 1867, the Constitution has provided for group rights in addition to individual rights. S. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, confers language rights that may be asserted by individuals because of their membership in a protected group. Consequently, as Professor Whyte observes: . . . It is impossible to discern in the constitutional text either the clear direction to promote liberal values as wholeheartedly as possible or the direction to sustain communitarian values to the greatest extent possible. The Charter reflects the tension. Of course, it gives impetus to the nation's change to liberalism, but it does not reveal, in any precise way, where the limit should be drawn to protect other political values.3The Canadian model (and there is no suggestion that, on this front, it should be different in Quebec) depicted above does not start with the proposition that either form of right is paramount or will necessarily converge or has a "trump" over other claims, but instead looks for the proper sphere of operation of each. This is a form of structural pluralism which must be respected. Claims that are, therefore, totalistic and which claim to represent in themselves all of "public policy" or "the view of the State" on a matter, where such recognition effectively delegitimizes other legal perspectives, must be rejected as overreaching or, at least, suspect until subjected to further analysis to ensure that they maximally respect legally contestable positions. Totalistic claims for "recognition" by any particular advocacy group do not respect diverse pluralism that holds together notions of group as well as individual rights and a plurality of moral perspectives. Taken together, therefore, we see that all Quebecers, like all Canadians, are necessarily believers that have faith. They are also members of a wide variety of faith communities gathered around whatever it is they believe—whether such beliefs are religious or nonreligious in origin. The beliefs of atheists and agnostics do not have a privileged claim in a society dedicated to equality and fairness.The Nature of the "Secular": The Canadian Supreme Court has Determined that Standard use of "Secular" as Religiously exclusive is not Appropriate in Canada. The same sort of confused use of language applies to the term "secular" but here the use by religious believers is almost exactly the same now days as it is by those who are non-religious believers. Consider how we speak of "religion AND the secular." The term "secular" has changed its meaning over the last century and a half. The term in general usage now means, essentially, free from religion as in "we ought to keep religion out of the schools because they are secular." This was not the original meaning, nor is it a meaning which recognizes the modus vivendi or diversity or pluralism. In short, the term "secular" must have a neutral meaning lest it be taken in an anti-religious direction. Yet if we assume, as many (most) do that the secular is stripped of religion, and that, secondly, the state is "secular" then we have assumed in our use that the state itself is, or must be, stripped of religion. But is this correct; is it fair? Now we must ask: is it legal? All citizens, as a matter of fact, as set out above, make their decisions in life based upon their beliefs. On one level, therefore, we are all "believers." The question is: "what do we believe in" and "for what reasons" and does the origin of our beliefs mean that some people (or some beliefs) have less importance in a society that says it will respect the ability of citizens to have the fundamental right and freedom to "belief" and "expression" in addition to "conscience and religion." Courts have, recently, come to acknowledge that any pre-emptive exclusion of "religion" from the category of "beliefs" or "secular" that may operate in the public sphere of society, is an unwarranted attack on the freedom of "conscience and religion" set out in Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This recognition is of great significance for public policy (in all provinces including Quebec) but it has yet to be widely understood as such. To allow only the beliefs of atheists and agnostics to have any public relevance is not to treat other beliefs fairly and those who hold them as equal citizens. To allow only those beliefs that emanate from the convictions of atheists and agnostics to have public relevance is discriminatory against religious beliefs just as much as to allow only religious beliefs to have public relevance would be discriminatory against non-religious believers. The principles of a free and democratic society require that all citizens are entitled to have their viewpoints respected within certain very broad parameters. It is not simply a matter of how beliefs are expressed but of what communities are nurtured and created by the analysis that must be examined. To the greatest extent possible public policy must try to encourage the diverse communities of belief that make up the tapestry of any "plural" society. The "secular" (a better term would be "public sphere") is, properly understood, a realm of competing faith/belief claims, not a realm of "non-faith" or "non-belief" claims because, strictly speaking, there can be no such realm. Human life and legislation are inescapably moral however implicit such morals are. In contemporary usage, "secular schools", "secular government", etc. are generally understood to mean non-religious or not influenced by religion or religious principles. We suggest that this is because we have adopted a secularist (which may be atheistic, agnostic or even religious) definition of "secular" rather than a richer and more properly inclusive conception. The separation of church and state is, after all, a jurisdictional distinction important to both the church and the state. A valid separation should not preclude a valid cooperation between church and state. Most religious groups in the west, for example, do not in fact want the state to run "the church" or vice versa. When we are tempted to use the term "secular" when we mean "the public sphere" or "the state" we would be better to say "public sphere" or "state" as these are free of the religiously exclusive baggage that currently encumbers use of the term "secular." When the Chamberlain v. Surrey School Board case came before the Supreme Court of Canada, all nine judges 1agreed with the reasoning of McKenzie J. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal as to the religiously inclusive meaning of "secular"—a usage in direct opposition to its general use. This means that for the purposes of Canadian law, "the secular" now means religiously inclusive not exclusive.4 As such it marks a strong divergence from "secularism" (recognized historically to be against the public involvement of religion) or contemporary forms of "laicism" such as evidenced in France or "strict separationalism" as seen in some quarters of the United States of America. Mr. Justice Gonthier for himself and Justice Bastarache, said this about the "secular": 137 In my view, Saunders J. below erred in her assumption that "secular" effectively meant "non-religious". This is incorrect since nothing in the Charter, political or democratic theory, or a proper understanding of pluralism demands that atheistically based moral positions trump religiously based moral positions on matters of public policy. I note that the preamble to the Charter itself establishes that "... Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law". According to the reasoning espoused by Saunders J., if one's moral view manifests from a religiously grounded faith, it is not to be heard in the public square, but if it does not, then it is publicly acceptable. The problem with this approach is that everyone has "belief" or "faith" in something, be it atheistic, agnostic or religious. To construe the "secular" as the realm of the "unbelief" is therefore erroneous. Given this, why, then, should the religiously informed conscience be placed at a public disadvantage or disqualification? To do so would be to distort liberal principles in an illiberal fashion and would provide only a feeble notion of pluralism. The key is that people will disagree about important issues, and such disagreement, where it does not imperil community living, must be capable of being accommodated at the core of a modern pluralism. [emphasis added].Needless to say, it will take some time before the full implications of this judgment are understood in relation to how a religiously inclusive conception of the public sphere functions in relation to different belief systems. The language in the area needs to change and, at the very least the term "secular" and the "believer/unbeliever" dichotomy should be avoided in favour of terms that more accurately convey what is meant and what is fair in the circumstances. The same is true, a fortiori, with respect to "secularism" and it is to that term that we now turn.What Secularism does and does not mean. Like the term "secular", the term "secularism" is not often examined but when it is we argue that its historical meaning is such that we should challenge fundamentally any idea that "secularism" is a valid principle upon which to base an open and democratic society such as Canada or a province such as Quebec. Iain Benson has written about this historical background elsewhere5 and we will not repeat that analysis here except to draw to the attention of the Commission that "secularism" is not a term that, properly understood, furthers the kind of religious inclusivity or relation between the state and public policy that we need to seek in Quebec or the rest of Canada. Alternative terminology can and should be found in place of this term, laden as it is, with particular anti-religious intent and deep contemporary ambiguity. If an inclusive public sphere is sought that is what should be discussed. "Secularism" of any sort just confuses the issue.Conclusion: Avoid "one size fits all conceptions" and terms such as "secularism" as we move towards an open and inclusive public sphere. Only a richer conception of how citizens with differing belief systems can co-exist will solve the dilemma posed by erroneous uses of key terms in aid of universal consensus. What is clear is that claims for "neutrality" based upon the prior exclusion of religious beliefs but the inclusion of other beliefs under misuse of terms' such as "believer/unbeliever", "secular" or "faith" fail to support a proper approach to accommodation of differing beliefs. Approaches to "pluralism", "equality" or "secularism" that implicitly or expressly see us moving towards eventual agreement on all matters, need to be rejected as inconsistent with human freedom or a proper diversity and accommodation. The State through its primary public policy drivers of law and politics should keep ever before us the need to find ways in which people who do not believe the same things can, nonetheless, share the public sphere and even work together in their joint task and privilege of citizenship. To do this going forwards requires a re-thinking and re-formulation of some of the central terms in our understanding of religions and the state, terms that have, as this Brief has attempted to show in the pages above, been much influenced by ideological developments intended to limit and exclude the public relevance of religious beliefs and religious communities. When religious believers and their communities are accorded the involved respect they are due then and only then will we see a corresponding support for public institutions and a greater sense of citizenship and provincial or national confidence and pride. Neither separation on a "strict separation" model nor laicism/secularism can provide this firm future for Quebec.THE FOREGOING IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.Notes 1 Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) para. 36. See, generally, for the Scope of Freedom of Religion in South Africa (much of which has been based upon Canadian decisions) Iain Currie and Johan de Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook (Cape Town: Juta, 2005) 5th ed. 336 – 357.2 Personal communication, 2006, with Dr. Paul Reed, Senior Social Scientist at Statistics Canada, Ottawa.3 John D. Whyte, "Is the Private Sector Affected by the Charter?" in Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights, L. Smith, ed.(Saskatoon: The Canadian Human Rights Reporter Inc., 1986) 145 at 177-1784 Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist. No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 749 (Can.) at 749 (Can.).. Madam Justice McLachlin, who wrote the decision of the majority, accepted the reasoning of Mr. Justice Gonthier on this point thus making his the reasoning of all nine judges in relation to the interpretation of "secular."5 Iain T. Benson, "Considering Secularism" in, Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion and Public Policy (Montreal: McGill/Queens, 2004) 83 – 93