For the last few decades, labour policy in Canada has resembled Aesop's mountain in labour. We've heard a lot of rumblings, seen a lot of smoke and hot air, but we have not seen a major restructuring of the ground. A variety of initiatives from the federal Conservatives, as well as controversial proposals on right to work in Ontario and Alberta, have renewed the rumblings, complete with fire and brimstone rhetoric about "attacks on labour" from the union movement. But while the rhetoric and the old union versus non-union policy framework have remained unchanged since the 1970s, the "on-the-ground" realities of labour relations in Canada have changed drastically. We suggest these changes open the door to a new policy framework on labour relations that can move Canadian labour relations in a more innovative, competitive, direction. What are these changes? First, cooperation between unions and employers is more the norm than the exception. The data show that time lost due to strikes and lockouts has been on a steady decline since the 1970s and is currently near an all-time low. Second, collective bargaining is no longer the sole prerogative of traditional trade unions. A wide variety of alternative bargaining arrangements have emerged in the last decade. Among these are alternative unions whose approach to collective bargaining differs both philosophically and structurally from traditional trade unions; human resource departments that mimic the collective bargaining process; creation of private, for profit, organizations which mimic many of the functions formerly performed by trade unions (i.e. labour supply pools, employer organizations); and the emergence of more professional associations and colleges which regulate professions, and which, even incidentally, affect wages, bargaining, and labour standards. Collective bargaining is, in short, a diverse field, even while the main legal framework remains wedded to the traditional union versus. non-union arrangement. Two further changes are well known. Union density (the proportion of paid workers who are union members)in Canada has been trending down for some time, and is hovering at around 31.5%. This number stands alongside a second trend: namely, an increase in the already large gap between union densities in the public sector—currently around 75%—versus those of the private sector—currently around 18%. But beneath those trends lies a less discussed trend: the consolidation of unionized workers into fewer, larger, traditional trade unions via mergers and acquisitions. As Stats Canada notes: Unionized workers are highly concentrated in a small number of large unions […] 46.6% of covered workers in national and international unions belong to just eight unions each covering at least 100,000 workers.In sum, four per cent of unions represent almost half (47%) of Canadian workers. And, if one includes the second tier of unions by size, that concentration increases: 11% of Canadian unions represent 72% of the unionized workforce. This consolidation, combined with the unwillingness—expressed in "no-raid" pacts—of most of these unions to compete for the loyalty of members on the basis of service leads to a trade union movement which is virtually monolithic in form and message. And that message has, overwhelmingly, been anti-conservative. Unions tend to see small "c" conservative policy, and the parties that espouse these policies, as their enemies. They have been willing to spend large sums and mobilize to counter them and to install parties more in line with their views. It should be no surprise that the feeling is mutual. This antipathy displays itself in policy by way of proposals and legislation which aim to use regulation to directly shape how unions and individual workers—and even non-members—interact, either via the way dues are collected, how workers can join a union, or how and to whom unions should report their financial transactions. A recent spate of proposals and legislation are indicative. Federal bills C-377 and C-525, and the recent Ontario Progressive Conservative and Wildrose "right-to-work" proposals all aim directly at unions themselves. The difficulty with this approach is that, all too often, it lends itself to instability in labour policy. The potential for large swings in labour policy—depending on the party currently in power—increases as the common ground between labour and certain segments of political power disappears. Political power, while it might last for considerable periods of time, is never fully secure, and the absence of a consensus on labour policy often resembles a pendulum. The replacement of the NDP Bill 40—introduced by the Rae government—by Bill 7 by the Progressive Conservative government of Mike Harris in the 1990s is but one example. The recent elections in British Columbia also underscore the point. In an economic world where political and labour stability are key factors in investment decisions, this instability can mean lost investment, lost employment and lost government revenues. A better approach recognizes the value of collective bargaining while simultaneously recognizing that major changes in the world of labour relations are already underway under our current regime—and without government intervention. In short, we recommend a policy which encourages competition between the plurality of means of collective bargaining and employer/employee relationships already in existence in the Canadian economy. We suggest that labour policy should focus on three parallel tracks:That, insofar as possible, government refuse to craft policies which deliberately favour a particular method of workplace organization, labour worldview, or labour organization at play in Canadian economic life. Rather, government should enact policy which levels the playing field between the competing views and let civil society determine the most appropriate method. Particular efforts should be made to eliminate laws which allow labour monopolies, or labour oligopolies, or which encourage rent-seeking by labour organizations. Two examples of this are the Saskatchewan government’s Bill 80, which eliminated provisions that gave a few unions a monopoly on collective bargaining in the construction industry, and a private member’s bill in Ontario (Bill 73) that aimed to eliminate the ability of a few private sector unions to control public procurement. We suggest government remove barriers that deliberately penalize one method of organizing workers—whether that be individual contracts, traditional trade union arrangements, alternative unions, or employee associations—and let workers vote with their feet.That the government reevaluate the labour relations regime which currently oversees public sector bargaining, with a view to re-asserting the primary role of the state as government rather than employer in situations where a necessary state monopoly exists. The government should consider its role in the creation of the labour monopolies that exacerbate their fiscal concerns—health care and education for instance—rather than trying to use labour relations policy to solve what are, in effect, unnecessary government monopolies. That the government concentrates on improving and easing the ability of existing workers’ organizations to work towards policy goals where there is a modicum of consensus. Both the right and left agree that workplaces should involve workers as much as possible—i.e. be democratic—while also being accountable primarily to their members. This should be true for all methods of organizing workers, union or otherwise.A policy platform that best fits the framework described above will evaluate each policy through the lenses of competition and cooperation. The facts on the ground suggest that the world of labour relations is changing even in the absence of proposed revolutionary changes such as the removal of the Rand formula. What is needed is not policy that aims to tear down or maintain unions in their current form, but which allows workers the greatest leeway to choose the labour relations environments that serve their individual and collective interests best. A policy that encourages the greatest amount of competition among these various means of organizing workplaces would lead to much more innovation in the world of labour relations than any proposal looking to maintain the status quo, or that aims to upset it by revolutionary measures such as right to work. In short, the ideal would be a policy regime wherein the state encourages the positive aspects of workplace organization where there is a high degree of consensus, while attempting to remain neutral about the ways workers choose to organize themselves. Currently many unions have an unhealthy fear of markets and categorically deny the possibility of a vital union movement in which competition is present. They note that employers will inevitably take advantage of a competitive union world. But unions, like employers, need to come to terms with the notion that competition and cooperation—between employers and unions, between a variety of unions, and between a variety of employers—are integrally linked. As noted by economist Paul Rubin has said: "Cooperation is the heart of economics; competition is a tool for obtaining better cooperation." Our framework and policy proposals suggest a way forward for labour relations in Canada. Such an approach would see the state allow the full range of players in the labour relations "market"—including the variety of labour relations models present on the ground today—to compete toward the goal of greater innovation, greater productivity and a fair distribution of the wealth generated by economic activity.