Those who theorize that striking down laws surrounding prostitution will make Canada a safer place to sell sex overlook a crucial countervailing truth. While there is no doubt the so-called sex trade is fraught with physical perils, the first and unavoidable harm for prostitutes is prostitution. Normalize it as some will by calling it the world's oldest profession, prostitution remains an inherently de-humanizing activity. Prostitution is, effectively, rental slavery in that its very nature reduces human beings purely to the dollar value of their genitals or their ability to rent themselves out for sexual gratification. Laws crafted to discourage prostitution should not be dismissed because they are deemed the detritus of sexual prudery. They go the root of how we view our society and should be determined and upheld based on a democratic discussion of how we wish to protect Canadians' basic human dignity. Unfortunately, the greater harm of prostitution is the essential point Ontario Justice Susan Himel disregarded when she struck down Canadian laws against keeping a common bawdy house, living off the avails of prostitution (pimping) or communicating for the purposes of prostitution. Justice Himel accepted the claims of three women charged under those sections of the law that the first two provisions violated their charter rights to life, liberty and security of the person. The women had argued that violence against prostitutes would decrease in indoor settings such as brothels or when they can retain "managers" or security personnel. She also agreed with their challenge to the communicating provision on the basis of charter guarantees of free expression, finding that allowing communication for the purpose of prostitution enhances safety by letting prostitutes screen customers. The Ontario Court of Appeal has given the federal government until next April to counter Himel's ruling. The time given Ottawa to organize its arguments is also an opportunity for Canadians to remind ourselves of what prostitution actually entails, and to reassert Parliament's prerogative to legislate on wider social harms that outstrip overly narrow definitions of individual freedom. There is no question arguments exist from a libertarian perspective in favour of permitting prostitution. The libertarian impulse creates an antipathy toward any "morality" laws including those dealing with illicit drugs, pornography and prostitution. Perhaps most Canadians wish Canada to become like Amsterdam with its window prostitutes and Nevada with its brothels. If so, it should be for that majority to convince parliamentarians that our society should be that permissive. What all Canadians must remember is that those foundations are the reason Parliament has always chosen to combat prostitution indirectly by making most acts associated with it criminal offences, though the act itself has never been illegal. While prostitution may not be a criminal offence, the provisions impugned in this case are clearly intended to severely restrict its practice. In complex social matters involving community values, deference to Parliament's social objectives is essential. In our system, the legislative branch is better able to react to the needs of Canadians and weigh the benefits and harms of current social practices and their impact on society. These provisions are designed to limit prostitution and therefore can be expected to interfere with the business of prostitution, even to the point of making it practically impossible. In her ruling, Himel defined the legislative objectives too narrowly to such concerns as limiting nuisances in the street. Such legal narrowness makes it much easier to undermine the provisions based on the countervailing "harm" to prostitutes who engage in a "legal" business. While the courts have previously held that preventing "dirt for dirt's sake" is not a legitimate objective that would justify violating the charter, the wider social objective of limiting or eliminating prostitution is legitimate. The harm caused by prostitution is considered by many Canadians (and by Parliament) to go beyond minor issues of nuisance, and is much greater than simply the legislation of morality. This is a view previously held by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1990 Prostitution Reference. "The fact that the sale of sex for money is not a criminal act under Canadian law does not mean that Parliament must refrain from using the criminal law to express society's disapprobation of street solicitation," wrote then Chief Justice Brian Dickson. None of us lives in splendid isolation. The moral disapprobation of prostitution is connected with our society's deep beliefs pertaining to dehumanizing acts associated with the rental of bodies for sexual gratification. Focusing on the barriers to safely practising prostitution caused by prohibiting brothels, pimping and soliciting fails to weigh such "harm" against the broader legislative aims and societal benefits of limiting prostitution. A significant resulting problem is that the government's objectives and the harm it seeks to avoid are measured by different standards than the "harm" caused to prostitutes. In demanding substantial social science "proof" from the government of the harm avoided, Himel requires Parliament to prove the negative. Parliament is thus precluded from relying on its legitimate broad objective based on human dignity and is instead required to prove the benefits of the provisions in narrow and mundane "avoidance of nuisance" terms. How can Parliament prove that its laws preserve human dignity by discouraging prostitution? Parliament will need to make arguments from a social values perspective and looking at negative impacts of prostitution more generally. Before dismissing the government's expert evidence of social harms of prostitution, Justice Himel ought to have borne in mind the Supreme Court of Canada's admonition that context, deference and a flexible and realistic standard of proof are essential aspects of the constitutional analysis. There are limits on social science evidence and when it comes to issues like these, Parliament needs some leeway to determine what should be a legitimate mode of living. It cannot constitutionally justify such laws without reference to the wider social structures under which Canadians choose to live. The issues involved in this case go far beyond what regulations on an economic transaction are justifiable from a "safety" perspective. Ideas concerning the value of humans and limits on how they treat their bodies remain relevant and important to the dialogue, but that dialogue is a democratic one effectively undertaken in legislatures, which are designed to formulate perspectives on controversial social practices.