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Law, Religion and Public Reasoning

January 16, 2012

Abstract A forceful recent opinion on law and religion by Lord Justice Laws in a religious discrimination case has drawn renewed attention to two principles often supposed by liberal legal and political theorists to be essential foundations of liberal democracy: the principle of state ‘neutrality’ towards religion; and the principle that public reasoning must be ‘secular’. This article argues that, while the first principle is defensible, the second principle is invalid and illiberal, and proposes a conception of public reasoning that permits, indeed positively encourages, the invocation of religiously based reasoning in ‘representative’ political speech. The first part of the article briefly states the central argument advanced in favour the principle of secular public reasoning, and its corollary, the ‘principle of restraint’ on religious reasons. In the second part, three widely invoked critiques of the principle of restraint are reviewed. The third part proposes that religiously based public reasoning is entirely compatible with, indeed enjoined by, the type of representative public speech that should characterize a confident liberal democracy. It also argues, however, that the first principle, state ‘neutrality’ towards religion (rightly understood), rules out explicit public appeal, by state officials, to religious reasons in justifying laws. Read the entire article online here.